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ABSTRACT 
"Enterprise zones" as a concept originated in England in the late 1970s. 
The idea is to free certain specified urban areas of taxes and government 
regulations to encourage private business investment and create new jobs. 
Empirical evidence to support the concept is lacking. This paper contains a 
discussion of the concept of enterprise zones, without reference to any legislative 
proposals in the United States. Analyses of legislation will appear as prime 
sponsors introduce new bills. 
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ENTERPRISE ZONES AS A CONCEPT* 
SUMMARY 
This paper contains a discussion of the concept of enterprise zones, 
without reference to any legislative proposals in the United States. Analyses 
of legislation will appear as the prime sponsors introduce new bills. 
The original concept of "enterprise zones" (a phrase coined by Professor 
Peter Hall in England in the late 1970s) was to create, on an experimental basis, 
a number of geographic areas in distressed English cities that would be free 
of taxes and government regulation. Such zones would replicate the conditions 
existing in Hong Kong at that time. The purpose of the zones would be 
to stimulate private business investment, and thereby create jobs, in abandoned 
or "problem" inner city areas. 
Many private sector spokesmen question the viability of the proposal. 
They note that specially tailored government services are also necessary 
requirements if private investors are to view depressed inner city areas as 
potential profitable locations for business. 
Empirical evidence to support the validity of the concept is lacking. A 
proposal to test the effects of Federal tax incentives in inner cities would 
* Preparation, and analysis contained in this report benefited from the 
contribution of Marietta Sharperson, Editorial Assistant, and Jeffrey 
Osborne, Reference Assistant. 
simulate the tax reductions, using funds from an existing Federal program. 
This test would allow estimates of costs of the incentives to be made 
(estimates which otherwise are not feasible), and would not necessarily 
require new legislation. 
An experimental program in the United Kingdom is authorized in enabling 
legislation enacted by Parliament in November 1980. Under this program, 
considerably modified from the original concept, there would be eleven zones 
in British cities, subject to agreements worked out with the respective local 
authorities. Officials have expressed hope that the first of these zones may 
be functioning by the summer of 1981. 
The Hong Kong model, and experience under three decades of Puerto Rico's 
Industrial Incentives Act (a key element in the island's "Operation Bootstrap" 
program), indicate that low wages may be at least as powerful as tax exemptions 
as location incentives for industry. Hourly manufacturing rates in Hong Kong, 
for example, are estimated to be only 14 percent of the rate in the United States. 
About half of Hong Kong's population is housed in government-owned housing for 
low income people, at token rentals. 
Some proponents of enterprise zones, particularly in Britain, including 
the originator of the concept, view them as a way of freeing specified 
areas from the effects of government regulations and policies. The concept 
does require government-sponsored incentives aimed to develop selected 
geographically defined areas in specified ways. The idea is less novel, 
therefore, than it might appear at first glance. On inspection, it does not 
represent a departure from government intervention in the economy (a government 
role it is intended to correct or replace), and in fact, might represent a 
disrupting action on the part of government, in that it may interfere sub- 
stantially with market forces in the private sector, according to some observers. 
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11. ORIGIN OF CONCEPT 
The phrase "enterprise zone" was coined by Professor Peter Hall in the 
late 1970s following visits to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Professor Hall was 
impressed by the vigor of the entrepreneurial activity in these places, 
contrasted to the depressed British economy. He attributed the difference 
to the relative absence of government regulation in the Hong Kong economy, 
and concluded that replicating this condition in Britain (reducing taxes 
and government regulations) might result in the same vigorous activity. L/ 
In the U.S., enterprise zones have had as their chief advocate Dr. 
Stuart Butler. - 2/ An enterprise zone, according to Dr. Butler and other writers 
on the concept, - 3/ is a geographic area with specified boundaries that would 
offer special government (central and local) incentives to owners of land and 
capital stock in the zone, and to potential investors outside the zone, with the 
aim of stimulating private investment in the zone. The zone would have a specified 
life span. The recommended incentives package consists primarily of various 
tax reductions, and also of some relaxation of regulations in an attempt to 
1/ Professor Peter Hall. Address to the Regional and Town Planning 
~nstitute Annual Conference, Chester, June 15, 1977. 
2 /  Dr. Butler is a policy analyst with The Heritage Foundation. 
He obtained a Ph.D. in economic history from the University of St. Andrews, 
in Scotland. He has taught economics at Hillsdale College, Michigan, and 
was executive secretary of the Adam Smith Institute of London before joining 
The Heritage Foundation in 1979. Dr. Butler has written on a number of 
subjects, concentrating on the effects of price and other incentives on 
economic choices. His publications include studies on national health insurance, 
rent control, telecommunications and inflation. 
31 See, for example, Enterprise Zones. Pioneering in the Inner City, 
Stuart Butler. The Heritage Foundation. Washington, D.C., 1980. 
recreate conditions of earlier eras when taxation and government regulation 
of business and of resource development were minimal or non-existent. The 
direct beneficiaries are intended, according to proponents, to be new small 
enterprises (some include the requirement "innovative"), that would not 
otherwise be encouraged to come into existence. Indirect beneficiaries would 
be the unemployed or low income residents of the zones or of near-by areas, 
who would be hired to fill the jobs created by the new enterprise. Among 
the assumptions stated by proponents of the concept are: (1) that taxes 
and government regulations are major start-up deterrents to new small 
enterprises; (2) that new small enterprises would be attracted to areas 
offering the tax-free, regulation-free environment envisioned in the zones; 
and (3) that the enterprises thus attracted would create new jobs for the 
unemployed or low-income residents of the zones or their surrounding areas. 
A further assumption is that the tax reductions would be compensated for 
by future increased tax revenues generated by the new enterprises, and by 
decreased government outlays for unemployment insurance and social service 
payments. These assumptions have yet to be tested. 
111. HONG KONG AS AN EXAMPLE 
Hong Kong, the inspiration for the Enterprise Zone concept, does have 
several of the characteristics that would occur in a model zone: low tax 
rates, few government regulations, and a specified life span. The current lease 
of the territory to the British by China ends in 1997. 
The incentives that have drawn investors to Hong Kong contrast 
dramatically with conditions found in most countries. In Hong Kong, 
the highest tax bracket amounts to 17 percent of income. Virtually 
all tariff and nontariff barriers to trade have been removed. While 
businesses in the United States and most of Europe cope with growing 
thickets of administrative law, Hong Kong industries are given far 
greater flexibility to respond to the needs of the world market. 
The result has been a steady rise in per capita income -- averaging 
more than 6 percent a year -- and a prospect that its living standards 
will soon surpass those of its former colonial ruler, Britain. - 41 
In addition to these incentives are the low wage rates prevailing in 
Hong Kong. In 1978, the estimated hourly wages of production workers in 
manufacturing was 14 percent of the U.S. rate, according to unpublished 
data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity 
and Technology (February 1980). 
A recent report in the Wall Street Journal (November 19, 1980, p. 11, 
reflects real estate conditions in Hong Kong that have required government 
intervention. Real estate experts say that Hong Kong's rents are now the highest 
in the world. This may be a condition to be expected in enterprise zones. 
As a result, half the population live in small, government-owned apartments 
for lower-income residents, and their rents are minimal. To protect the 
4/ Free Trade Zones: A Growing Phenomenon Around the Globe, by 
Marc hazier. In Transatlantic Perspectives, a publication of the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States. Number Four. January 1981, p. 8. 
middle-class who are not eligible for the public housing, the government 
imposed residential rent controls in December 1980. Since most of Hong 
Kongls territory is leased from the Chinese government under a lease that 
will expire in 1997, the real estate developers in Hong Kong appear to 
prefer making their profits before that time. This is a possibility which 
some observers believe may explain the extremely high rents. 
Experimental a Nature of Zones. The original suggestions for enterprise 
zones emphasized that they would be experiments. Professor Hall expressed 
his views of the enterprise zone approach in an address to the Regional and 
Town Planning Institute, Chester, England, June 15, 1977: 
Since it would represent an extremely drastic last-ditch 
solution to urban problems, it could be tried only on a 
very small scale. It is most appropriate to inner city 
areas that are largely abandoned and denuded of people, 
or alternatively areas with very grave social and economic 
problems. 
In agreement with Professor  all's idea that enterprise zones should 
be tried "only on a very small scale," Sir Geoffrey Howe, currently Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, in a speech in London, June 26, 1978, emphasized: 
This suggestion would not be based on considerations of 
regional policy (whichx an entirely distinct subject, 
with its own complexities and counterarguments). Rather 
the idea would be to set up test market areas or laboratories 
in which to enable fresh policies to prime the pump of prosperity, 
and to establish their potential for doing so elsewhere. 
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IV. BRITISH EXPERIMENT 
The current experimental program of enterprise zones being developed by the 
British government represents some modification of Professor Hall's original 
idea. The enabling legislation for the British program is in the Local Government 
Planning and Land Act of 1980 (Chap. 65, Sec. 179), enacted in November 1980. 
The first of a group of 11 experimental zones in Britain may be ready to begin 
operation by the summer of 1981, according to Paul McQuail, Undersecretary of 
Her Majesty's Department of Environment. 
During the legislative progress of the Enterprise Zone proposal, a 
number of cities were invited to submit suggestions for locations that 
might be designated as Enterprise Zones. By February 1981, eleven sites 
had been formally selected by the government for designation, pending 
successful agreement regarding boundaries and other matters with the local 
authorities concerned. 
The Enterprise Zone legislation provides for contractual agreement 
between the central government and the local authority. Under this agreement 
the boundaries of the zone are to be set, and a procedure for permitting 
development is to be established. The procedure must include a drastically 
simplified regime of zoning and building permits. Any development that 
conforms with these broad zoning conditions would be allowed automatically. 
The conditions are not, however, to conflict with basic health, safety and 
pollution standards. If a proposed development does not fit these conditions, 
it may be still go ahead if its meets the normal criteria laid down by the 
local authority. The simplified zoning agreement can be modified, but only 
with the consent of both the local authority and the national government. 
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This relaxation in the permit procedure for development is a central 
feature of the Enterprise Zones in Britain, and is designed to encourage 
rapid physical development in the sites. 5/ Again, none of the eleven zones - 
so far announced is yet in operation. 
A. Incentives and Comments Under the British Plan 
The concessions offered to business within each zone 
depend, in pan, on the cooperation of local planning au- 
thorities. The following are the key elements of the pro- 
gram, which will be in effect for I 0  yean: 
Exemption from development land tax. This is essen- 
tially an exemption from capital gains tax, which is 
normally applied on the increase in value that a devel- 
opcr sains when he sells his land. Because land values 
in enterprise zones are expected to increase signifi- 
cantly, this exemption will primarily benefit those who 
owned the land when the zone was declared. 
Capital ailo~vonces of 100 percent. This is a substantial 
concessron, eliminating the tax normally paid on new 
commercial and industrial buildings. It is a particular 
inducement to new commercial development, such 
as office bulldings or supermarkets, because industrial 
property already receives a 5 0  percent allowance. 
Exemption from general rares. General rates, like p r o p  
eny taxes in the United States, are levied by local au- 
thorities. This provision is the major fiscal concession 
of the plan; it will affect virtually everyone. This is also 
the most costly element, because the central govem- 
ment will have to reimburse local governments for lost 
revenue. According to the Treasury, the general-rate 
exemption could cost as much as $120 million a year 
once all zones have been fully developed. 
Simplifcarion of planning procedures. This provision is 
the very core of the enterprise zone experiment. It r e p  
resents an effort to break the stranglehold of the plan- 
ning bureaucracy, to permit a maximum flexibility in 
land usage with a minimum degree of government inter- 
ference. The provision is opposed by local planning 
authoriries who stand to lose a substantial degree of 
control over a ponion of their communities. Opposition 
is sharpened by the fact that the old industrial areas 
nominated for enterprise zone status are often domi- 
natcd by the Labour Party. . Abolirion of industrial developmenr ccrrificater. The 
certificates have long served as a means of directing in- 
dustrial development to the "assisted areas" (such as 
Scotland, Wales, and the north of England) where un- 
employment is highest. A developer who plans a large 
factory can only obtain the necessary certificate if he is 
willing to build in an area of great employment need. 
The zones will not require these cenificates. This means 
that zones in the Midlands or even in London will qual- 
ify as sites for new heavy industry. 
The remaining exemptions are relatively minor, involv- 
ing abolition of the industrial training requirement (under 
which most firms must offer training to unskilled workers 
or pay a levy to an independent training board); reduc- 
tion of government requirements for statistical informa- 
tion and other paperwork; speedier handling of requests 
for customs warehousing; and relief from levies on cus- 
toms reprocessing. These exemptions may be expected 
primarily to benefit small enterprises that lack the staff or 
capital to meet therequirements. 
What is not exempted is nearly as imponant as what is. 
There will be no relaxation, for instance, of worker health 
and safety legislation or of pollution controls. Although 
Sir Geoffrey originally spoke of abolishing any wage and 
price controls within the zones, and relaxing the Employ- 
ment Protection Act provisions, the present Government 
has no wage or price controls to exempt, and it has already 
amended the Employment Protection Act for all indus- 
try. Minimum wage provisions will also remain in effect 
throughout the zones. 6-/ 
5 1  Dr. Stuart Butler, The Heritage Foundation, in testimony before the 
subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, Senate Committee on Government 
Relations, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, Senate Committee 
on Government Relations. February 26, 1981. 
6 1  Enterprise, Zones: Tool of Urban Revitalization. In Transatlantic 
~ e r s ~ ~ c t i v e s ,  A Publication of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 
No. 4, January 1981. 
Critics of the British plan for enterprise zones have made a number 
of observations, including the following: 
". . . a surge in demand for space in the 500 acre zones could 
raise property prices and rents so as to cancel out the tax 
and rates concessions to industrialists with only the property 
developer really benefiting. The experimental nature of the 
zones may frighten off pension fund investment (despite all 
the anti-planning ideology, planning means 'security' to large 
investors) and rather than stimulate new investment the zones 
may simply attract existing activity, perhaps shunting it around 
from equally needy adjacent areas thus further damaging them. 
Strongly opposing the scheme before it became Official 
Government policy in March, the Royal Town Planning Institute 
challenged the Government to produce evidence that it was 
planning controls which were stopping industrial development; 
removing controls would adversely affect residential areas 
and entail high costs to the community, with at best only 
marginal net gains to some private firms." - 71 
Dr. Butler, while advocating the concept, also has noted some objections 
to the British plan for the enterprise zone: 
First small business organizations in Britain argue that the Enterprise 
- 9  
Zone incentives will not encourage small entrepreneurs to move into the zones. 
Most new, small companies, they point out, do not have a significant tax 
liability -- if any at all -- and so tax allowances are not a major incentive. 
Small companies also tend to require inexpensive accommodation for their first 
location. Yet the incentives in the zone favor the construction of higher-priced 
facilities for ownership. 
71 Back to the 19th Century. New Statesman. v. 100, July 11, 1980. 
p .  437 
Second, while the incentives in the British zones may seem to be very 
substantial, capital assets for industrial purposes can already be depreciated 
totally in one year, and there is a 50 percent allowance against tax for 
industrial buildings in the first year. Despite these incentives that 
exist nationwide, British cities are not flourishing, nor is significant 
reindustrialization occurring. Furthermore, the small business sector 
is one of the weakest of any western country. 
Third, the British emphasis on incentives to encourage major developers 
to move into the zones may cause a relocation of old jobs rather than the 
creation of new ones. Small businessmen -- especially retailers -- have also 
expressed the fear that large, well-financed competition from the zones may 
damage nearby businesses. 81 Proponents have not yet directly replied to these 
criticisms. 
81 Statement to the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, 
senate Committee on Government Relations, February 26, 1981. 
IV. GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IN ENTERPRISE ZONES 
The central theme o f  eliminating government from the zones may be seen 
from the cover of a brochure announcing a seminar sponsored by The Heritage 
Foundation on enterprise zones: 
ENTERPRISE ZONES: 
A Solution to.the 
Urban Crisis? 
An Editorial Seminar Sponsored by 
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
513 C St., N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20002 
September 24,1980 
at the Quality Inn Capitol Hill 
415 New Jersey Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
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Originally, the enterprise zone idea was associated with "the most outrageous 
form of laissez-faire." 9/ Within such a zone, all government activity would - 
cease. There would be no taxes, no public services, no government regulations 
except the most minimum required to maintain buildings for health and safety. 
Despite this emphasis on keeping governments out, Dr. Butler views 
the zones as having multiple social objectives: 
"The American proposals should be examined in the light of the 
British experience so far, but the differences between the two 
countries should be borne in mind. Crime and racial tensions 
are much less of a problem in British cities, and little attention 
has been given in the British zones to any social objectives. 
But in America the creation of jobs cannot be the soie purpose 
of the zones. They must also provide opportunities for local 
residents to enter business. If they fail to do so, they will 
not achieve the sense of community and racial harmony that 
is the foundation of a successful neighborhood." 101 (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Other testimony before Congress, by officials of Control Data Corporation's 
City Venture Corporation, 111 reveals a private sector attitude on the presence 
of government in enterprise zones. The top officers of City Venture strongly 
advocated that joint public/private comprehensive planning be part of any program 
91 Peter Hall, in a speech previously referred to on p. 3. - 
101 Statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, 
commztee on Government Relations, February 26, 1981. 
111 "City Venture is a for-profit consortium formed two and one-half 
years'ago to plan and manage innovative, comprehensive and, most importantly, 
holistic programs for the revitalization of decaying sectors of urban 
areas. In going about this task, we are careful to avoid the piecemeal 
and fragmented efforts which have unfortunately characterized past 
efforts led by the public sector. The creation of jobs is City Venture's 
number one priority -- jobs for the unemployed and underemployed, with 
a related top priority of education and training." Source and same as in 
footnote 11. Appendix A contains materials describing the City Venture 
Corporation program in some detail. 
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of government assistance to the private sector in revitalizing urban areas. E/ 
Herbert Trader, President of City Venture Corporation and Vice President 
of Control Data Corporation, outlined the comprehensive kinds of government 
assistance he views as essential for the success of private firms investing 
in inner city areas. They include the following: 
o Industry-specific vocational training funds tailored to 
the jobs the prospective business would create. 
o Land write-down techniques to overcome high costs of 
constructing facilities in the city compared to the 
suburbs. (If a site cannot be obtained at a cost 
comparable to suitable land in a suburban location, 
that fact alone may frequently discourage investment.) 
o Support services for employees and their families, such 
as health, day care, education, and pre- and post - 
employment counseling programs. 
o Property and casualty insurance, perhaps through government 
guaranteed re-insurance programs. (This suggestion is also 
mentioned by Robert Robin in his proposal outlined in a 
subsequent section of this paper.) 
o Land and facility grants (through the type of grants under 
Urban Development Act Grants or the Economic Development 
Administration.) The grants could be repaid from rents 
accrued from the facilities, or from a share of the tax 
credit granted for jobs, created as a result of the 
facility. Investors might be encouraged to provide 
reduced rent for small business clients in return for 
tax advantages or loan guarantees. 
o Improvement of the physical environment, and basic 
local services (police and fire protection, road network, 
public transportation). 
121 Testimony of Jim Harrington, Vice President, City Venture Corporation, 
before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, House Committee on Public 
Works and Transportation, March 11, 1981; and testimony of Herbert F. Trader, 
President, City Venture Corporation, and Vice-president of Urban Programs, 
Control Data Corporation, before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 26, 1981. 
VI. NEED FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Puerto ~ico. Although proposals for Federal tax reductions targeted 
to specific geographic areas are not new, there is little empirical evidence 
to suggest what the effects of such targeted reductions would be, since there 
are only rare examples of their actual application. One such example is the 
exemption of Puerto Rican corporations under section 936 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. This provision for Federal tax exemption complements Puerto Rico's Industrial 
Incentives Act. The Act is a prominent feature of "Operation Bootstrap," 
a series of economic development programs begun by the Government of Puerto 
Rico in the late 1940s. 
The purpose of Operation Bootstrap is to attract businesses engaged in 
manufacturing, tourism, and exporting, in order to create jobs for the unemployed 
and to raise incomes. Puerto Rico's Industrial Incentives Act, offering tax 
exemptions to qualifying businesses, combines with section 936 of the Federal 
Code to provide virtually complete tax exemption to these businesses. There 
are provisions under the Act for total tax exemption for businesses for ~eriods 
from 10 to 30 years, with the longer periods applying in geographic areas that 
are more depressed. A business may elect partial tax exemption for a longer 
period. The exemptions apply to the corporate income tax, the property tax, 
municipal license taxes, excise taxes on materials and equipment, and the 
individual income tax on dividends paid by exempt corporations. 
Evaluations of the impacts of the program differ in the measures they 
emphasize, such as total new investment brought to the island, number of 
firms that have stayed on after the end of the tax exemptions, increase in 
per capita income since the beginning of the program, or change in unemployment 
rates. There is little disagreement, however, that it has been a combination 
of low wages and other "real" economic factors, along with tax incentives, rather 
than tax incentives alone, that has attracted businesses to Puerto Rico. For 
example, the heavy concentration in investment in labor intensive industries 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, reflects the influence of Puerto Rico's relatively 
low wage rates during that period. The later build-up of the petro-chemical 
industry may owe much of its impetus to lower costs of oil compared to costs 
on the mainland, prior to 1973. Professor Lester Thurow of M.I.T. has concluded 
that tax incentives alone have magnified, but not created, Puerto Rico's 
attraction as an industrial location. The tax exemption, in other words, 
only brings industry to the island once it is demonstrated that Puerto Rico 
also offers other economic advantages compared to alternative locations. - 131 
There is also general agreement that unemployment would be much 
higher in Puerto Rico, had it not been for the large migration of islanders 
to the mainland over the last three decades. 
The Economic Study of Puerto Rico - 141 concludes that Puerto Rico's low 
wage rates were the chief incentive for business to locate there from the 
late 1940s to 1960, and that the island's tax incentives were not essential 
for the industrial development of that period. During the last ten years, 
the wage rates have reached higher levels (though still not equal to those 
131 "Puerto Rican Industrialization Incentives for the 1970s and 1980s." 
A prepared for the Puerto Rico Planning Board, 1970 discussed in Economic 
Study of Puerto Rico, Volume 11. Report to the President prepared by the 
Interagency Task Force Coordinated by the United States Department of Commerce, 
December 1979. 
141 Report to the President prepared by the Interagency Task Force 
~oorxnated by the United States, Department of Commerce. December, 1979. 
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on the mainland), and tax exemptions were found to have been more important 
as location incentives. Other low-wage countries, however, now compete with 
Puerto Rico for many manufacturing functions, and the tax incentives have 
been found to be no longer sufficient to attract new firms that would hire 
low-skilled workers. 
The aim of the tax incentive program was to attract firms that would 
become established in Puerto Rico. The study found that many of those who 
which were attracted, however, left at the end of the tax exempt period, 
since they had not developed linkages with the local economy that would make 
it advantageous for them to stay. Puerto Rico has, therefore, served as a 
tax haven when it might have attracted many of the same firms without resorting 
to tax incentives, according to the Economic Study of Puerto Rico. Current 
promotional efforts for industrial development in Puerto Rico are based on 
the appeal of a highly trained, efficient work force with relatively lower 
wage rates than the mainland. g/ 
15/ Mr. Randy Mye, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
in a telephone conversation on March 23, 1981. 
Proposals For Experimental or Demonstration Programs in the United States 
Some observers in the U.S. favor a demonstration program of enterprise 
zones, following the original concept and the British example in this respect. 
Among them are spokesmen for the Administration, and Chairman Henry Reuss of 
the Joint Economic Committee. 
A proposal for a simulated program of Federal tax incentives for community 
economic development, which would be carried out prior to enacting any legislation, 
appears in Robert S. Robin's article, "A Taxpayer's Choice Incentive System: 
An Experimental Approach to Community Economic Development Tax Incentives." - 161 
The general question this proposed program addresses is whether and to what 
extent tax incentives would be used by taxpayers to locate in a given area. 
Rather than offer a fixed tax incentive package, the proposal would offer 
a choice of incentives, each one assigned a number of points, and the taxpayer 
would put together his own "tailor-made" package, based on a total number 
of points allowed, that his calculations indicated would result in maximum 
benefits to his business. The government would pay out to the taxpayer 
the difference between his actual taxes and the simulated taxes, from funds 
in an already existing program. 
An example of a system for assigning points to various tax incentives 
that a taxpayer might elect is as follows: 171 - 
16/ In Law and Contemporary Problems. School of Law. Duke University. 
Vol. -1, No. 1, Winter, 1971. p. 99-118. Mr. Robin is a practicing attorney 
in Chicago, Illinois. 
17/ Robin, Ibid. -
I Rapid write off of physical facilities. 
(a) Write off covering the physical plant but not real estate. 
(i) in 36 months-X points 
(ii) in 30 months-X plus z points 
(iii) in 24 months-): plus 4 points 
(b) Write off of both physical facility and real estate 
( i )  in 36 months-X points 
(ii) in 30 months-X plus 2 points 
(iii) in 24 months-X plus 4 p i n t s  
2. Physical facility investment tax credit. 
at 7%-X points 
at S:/,--X plus z points 
at 9%-S plus 4 points 
at ro>/,-X plus 6 points 
3. Humm investment tax credit. 
at  ~oi/,--X points 
at I I"/,--X plus 2 points 
nt 12",c-X plus 4 points 
nt 13:<--X plus 6 points 
4. Postponcmcnt of capital gain on sale; non-recapture in evcnt of sde; sustained 
flexibility tax credit effective after sale. 
(a) If elected-X plus 20 points 
(b) If  not elected, then double the amount of bencfits otherwise elected may 
be chosen 
Advan tages  o f  t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  program p r o p o s a l  i n c l u d e  t h e  a b i l i t y  
t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t a x  i n c e n t i v e s  would a t t r a c t  b u s i n e s s e s  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  
a r e a s ,  and t o  measure  t h e  c o s t s  o f  t h e  t a x  i n c e n t i v e s  l o  t h e  government .  
T h e r e  may b e  c e r t a i n  r i s k s  o f  c o s t  f o r  a b u s i n e s s  i n  l o c a t i n g  i n  i n n e r  
c i t y  a r e a s  t h a t  may n o t  be  o f f s e t  by t a x  i n c e n t i v e s  ( s u c h  a s  c r i m e ,  f i r e  h a z a r d s ,  
a b s e n c e  of t r a i n e d  w o r k e r s ) .  To meet t h e s e  r i s k s ,  one s u g g e s t i o n  i s  f o r  a 
special government insurance program in which private sector insurance 
companies develop a pooled risk program with government participation. 1 8 1  
This proposal, of course, is counter to the original enterprise zone concept 
which would discourage government presence in a zone. 
1 8 1  Robin, I b i d . ,  p. - 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A .  "The Ecological F'allacy" 
Measurements of the impacts of industrial incentives for a given geographic 
area may reveal improved statistics on employment and per capita income (as 
in Puerto Rico and Hong Kong), without any actual improvement in the 
economic conditions of most residents of the area. This can happen, for 
example, if there is large migration out of the area, as in Puerto Rico in 
the past three decades, removing many of the unemployed, but still leaving 
many behind. Another example is the effects of higher real estate and housing 
costs on lower income residents. Also, income distribution may be skewed heavily 
to a small proportion of the population with high incomes (as in Hong Kong), 
allowing an improvement in the statistical measure of per capita income, but 
no actual improvement (or possibly a decline) in the level of income of the 
larger proportion of the population. These phenomena are sometimes referred 
to as examples of the "ecological fallacy.'' 
Further, at the local level, when tax exemptions are granted to corporations 
at the same time that public expenditures must be made to supply infrastructures 
and services, the personal income tax must bear the burden of these public 
expenditures (as in Puerto Rico). Finally, there may be costs related to 
the natural environment, such as air and water pollution, noise, and depletion 
of natural resources (as in Puerto Rico, for example, with development of 
petro-chemical and other industries) which may not be accounted for in assessing 
impacts of industrial incentives. 
It is, therefore, not easy to evaluate the effects of incentive programs 
such as those in enterprise zone proposals, and almost impossible to estimate 
their costs. 
B. Are The Aims Compatible? Do The Policy Instruments Match The Aims? 
The combination of aims that proponents of enterprise zones express 
attracts interest and support from a range of the spectrum of economic 
interests. The general overall aim to revitalize depressed inner city areas 
can appeal to owners of land and fixed capital assets, to unemployed residents, 
and to the local government seeking to improve its tax base. The more 
specific aim to generate new business by means of tax exemptions raises the 
question of whether tax exemptions are the incentive that business would elect 
(see testimony by Control Data Corporation officials, for example footnote 
12, p. 131, and also of who would bear the cost of the incentives. The aim to 
create new jobs for the unemployed residents raises the question, based on 
experience in the Watts area of Los Angeles (See Appendix B) and in other places, 
whether the new firms can actually profit by hiring from this largely unskilled, 
inexperienced labor pool. (See Appendix C for an account of a successful 
private sector program). Cities find the enterprise zone concept appealing 
because it appears to offer yet another form of Federal assistance -- business 
tax exemptions -- in their attempts to rebuild obsolete areas. They emphasize, 
however, that they view enterprise zones as an addition to existing assistance 
programs (such as those of the Economic Development Administration, Urban 
Development Action Grants, and others), rather than as a substitute for them. - 191 
After praising the recent bill introduced by the Chairman of the Washington, 
D.C., City Council to authorize enterprise zones in the Nation's capital, however, 
191 Urban Policy Round Table, Academy for Contemporary Problems, 
washington, D.C. January 14, 1981. 
The Washington S t a r  comments i n  an e d i t o r a l ,  "Un t i l  t h e  concept  i s  t r i e d  i n  
s e v e r a l  p l a c e s ,  over  a  l ong  pe r iod ,  no one can  even be s u r e  whether  new jobs 
w i l l  be gene ra t ed  o r  o ld  ones r e l o c a t e d  t o  t ake  advantage of t h e  zones." =/ 
This  l a t t e r  remark r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of how t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  zone in-  
c e n t i v e s  might complement, o r  run  coun te r  t o ,  e x i s t i n g  S t a t e  and l o c a l  
i n d u s t r i a l  i n c e n t i v e  packages. The S t a t e  and l o c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  r e p r e s e n t  
"micro" economic p o l i c y ,  aimed t o  improve r e g i o n a l  o r  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
wh i l e  a  Fede ra l  i n c e n t i v e  such a s  t a x  exemptions i n  e n t e r p r i s e  zones ,  
t h a t  aims t o  g e n e r a t e  new e n t e r p r i s e s ,  might be cons ide red  a  "macro" economic 
p o l i c y ,  w i th  a  "micro" t a r g e t i n g  element .  Whether l o c a l i t i e s  w i th  e x i s t i n g  
i n c e n t i v e s  would t i e  i n  an e n t e r p r i s e  zone po l i cy  wi th  t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  programs 
i s  i n  ques t ion .  I f  t hey  d i d ,  t hen  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  zone might s imply add t o  t h e  
a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  compe t i t i on  f o r  i n d u s t r y  among S t a t e s  and l o c a l i t i e s .  - 211 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  zone were no t  r e l a t e d  t o  o t h e r  i n c e n t i v e  
programs, i t  might have t h e  e f f e c t  of fragmenting development e f f o r t s .  
20/ The Washington S t a r .  Thursday, March 19 ,  1981. p. 13. -
21/ For d i s c u s s i o n  of S t a t e / l o c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  and economic development, -
s e e ,  f o r  example, t h e  fo l lowing :  Hellman, Daryl A . ;  Gregory H. Wassa l l ;  and 
Lawrence Falk.  S t a t e  F i n a n c i a l  I n c e n t i v e s  t o  Indus t ry .  Lexington Books. D.C.  
Hea l th  and Company, Lexington,  Massachuse t t s .  1976. 147 p.;  Advisory Commission 
on  In te rgovernmenta l  Re la t i ons .  S t a t e  Community A s s i s t a n c e  I n i t i a t i v e s :  Innova t ions  
of t h e  La t e  1970s. An In fo rma t ion  Report M-116. Washington, D.C. May 1979. 51  
p.;  and Cornia ,  Gary C ;  William A. Tes t a ;  and F r e d e r i c k  D. Stocke r .  S ta te -Local  
F i s c a l  I n c e n t i v e s  and Economic Development. Academy f o r  Contemporary Problems. 
Columbus, Ohio. June 1978. 19 p. 
C. Would "Derelict" Areas In Inner Cities Be Developed Without 
An Enterprise Zone Program? 
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 
on February 26, 1981, Professor Donald A. Hicks of the University of Texas, 
Dallas, suggested that the enterprise zone is not immune to the charge of being 
"a quiptessential example of 'social engineering"' (emphasis in original). For 
some, he noted, the suspending or weeding out of regulations, and the lowering 
of taxes, suggests a less fettered market process. For others, however, these 
moves may be viewed as creating an artificial business climate that cannot operate 
as part of the larger economic system. "Areas that are targeted for designation 
as enterprise zones may be in the process of evolving (emphasis in original) 
to the point that they can perform new functions for the larger community 
.. . . countless central cities are transforming to play equally vital, if 
narrower, roles for the larger region . . . [compared to their earlier roles].'' 
Possibly, he says, such public intervention as enterprise zones might disrupt 
this process, which might yield a more easily sustained economic activity 
than that induced by public sector intervention. 
On the other hand, without relying on the enterprise zone concept, 
there are already underway many locally initiated public projects to 
attract industry to vacant or abandoned urban areas. In New York for 
example, the Port Authority has announced its first major venture into 
industrial development. It will spend $33.6 million to create three. 
industrial parks in the South Bronx, on Staten Island, and in ~lizabeth, New 
Jersey. The aim is to attract industry that will provide 5,000 new jobs 
for the New York region. 241 Another public project for the South Bronx 
is the Bathgate Industrial Park, sponsored by the New York City Public 
Development Corporation in partnership with the South Bronx Development 
Organization. The question uppermost in the mind of the Public Development 
Corporation's president is not whether there will be a tenant in the first 
building, but rather what kind of tenant it will be. The hope is to attract 
as a tenant a relatively labor intensive business which will in turn attract 
other businesses to other sites in the eight-block area. - 251 What impact 
might an enterprise zone have on these efforts? This is a question that deserves 
careful consideration, and that points up the delicate linkages among various 
forms of public sector intervention in urban economies, and between public 
and private sector activities. 
There may be some argument as to whether the "derelict" areas in industrial 
cities are really ". . . blighted by the planning process, and by rules and 
regulations that stifle private initiative," as Sir Geoffrey Howe says. If 
such areas have indeed been the result of unbridled laissez-faire free enterprise 
in earlier periods before taxation, planning, and regulation, and if planning 
and regulations imposed more recently by governments have been in an effort 
to preclude the creation of still more derelict areas, is there still a case 
for the argument that the measures intended as preventative may stand in the 
way of reclaiming areas already spoiled? 
2 4 1  Port Authority Plans 3 Industrial Parks. The New York Times. 
~ r i d a c  March 13, 1981, p. 1. 
251 Industrial Park Set for Bronx. The New York Times. Wednesday, 
~archl8, 1981. p. D-21. 
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APPENDIX A CRS-27 
PRIVATE SECTOR JOBS IN THE INNER CITY 
The Control Data- Experience 
By Marc Bendick, Jr. and Mary Lou Egan 
Can private enterprise provide quality jobs for inner- 
city residents and still remain profitable? The Selby 
Bindery, operated by the Control Data Corporation 
in a poor neighborhood in St. Paul, has done just 
that. The financial viability of the plant suggests that 
the experience can be replicated by firms in other 
cities. 
Today, some 24 million Americans 
remain in poverty, more than half of 
them too young, too old or too ill to 
work. But for some 10 million of these 
individuals, one possible path out of 
poverty is earned income-well-paid, 
stable jobs with advancement opportu- 
nities. 
Unfortunately, such "high-quality" 
jobs-and sometimes any job at all- 
remain a dream for many low-income 
persons. Partly because they lack spe- 
cific skills or an established work his- 
tory, and partly because school or home 
responsibilities prohibit them from tak- 
ing full-time jobs, many remain unem- 
ployed, out of the labor force, or 
trapped in low-wage, no-advancement, 
high-turnover jobs. 
These circumstances are particularly 
common for "welfare mothers" who 
have been out of the labor market while 
caring for young children, teenagers in 
transition from school to work, persons 
who have been unemployed for so long 
that they have lost work habits, and per- 
sons with a stigmatizing past such a s  an 
arrest record. No matter how much 
such individuals might need or want 
goodquality jobs, the jobs are simply 
not accessible to them. 
This article is about one private sec- 
tor industrial plant which, for over a 
decade, has provided several hundred 
highquality industrial jobs to exactly . 
such persons. The plant is the selby" 
Bindery, operated by the Control Data 
Corporation (CDC) in the inner city of 
St. Paul, Minnesota. Significantly, this 
plant has been able to provide these job 
opportunities while simultaneously 
meeting the private-market test of prof- 
itability; it has done so without substan- 
tial public subsidies and with relatively 
limited input from its parent corpora- 
tion. Because of the financial viability 
of the enterprise, it is potentially rep 
licable by other entrepreneurs. - 
The Selby Bindery 
The Selby-Dale neighborhood of St. 
Paul, Minnesota is typical of many 
inner-city areas. In 1970, when Control 
Data Corporation established its Selby 
Bindery there, 58 percent of the resi- 
dents were nonwhite; only 41 percent 
of persons over age 25 had completed 
high school; 30 percent of the children 
were living in families headed by fe- 
males; 20 percent of the families were 
receiving public assistance; and 9 per- 
cent of adult males were unemployed, 
triple the rate for the metropolitan area. 
The Selby plant, which employs 
about 300 persons, provides collating, 
b id ing ,  packaging and mailing ser- 
vices. Operations are performed largely 
by hand or  with the aid of relatively 
simple machines such as shrink-wrap 
pers ,  power staplers and power 
punches. In 1979, sales totalled about 
$1.3 million, 86 percent of which r e p  
resented internal work for the Control 
Data Corporation; the remaining sales 
came from over 80 outside commercial 
customers. 
Marc Bendick, Jr. is a Senior Research As- 
sociate in the Employment and Labor Policy 
Program at the Urban Institute, Washington, 
D.C. Mary Lou Egan is a graduate student 
in the School of Government and Business 
at George Washington University. 
For more than a decade. the Control Data Corporation's Selby Bindery has provided several hundred high-quality jobs for inner-c~ty residen!~ 
of St. Paul. Minneso:a and has operated as a profitable private enterprise as well. 
Commentary 13 
Selby's work force is drawn almost 
enliidy from the surrounding neighbor- 
hood. Some 72 percent of Selby em- 
ployees reside in the same ZIP code 
area as that of the plant, and an addi- 
tional 25 percent live in an adjacent ZIP 
code area (see table). Nearly 90 percent 
of the employees are non-Caucasian, 
and 65 percent did not complete high 
school. Two-thirds are women, and 
nine out of ten are age 30 or  under. 
CDC's hiring policy gives preference 
to neighborhood residents and uses 
"economic need" as one employment 
criterion; these policies often do not 
produce the same selection decision 
that "ability to do the job" would pro- 
duce. Virtually no production job in the 
plant requires prior technical skills, 
however, and most machine operations 
can be learned in a few hours. Lack of 
experience or training, therefore, need 
nor be a barrier to hiring. 
Selby jobs are made accessible to 
fieighborhood residents in one impor- 
tant way: they are part-time jobs sched- 
uled to match the times when workers 
are available. One shifts runs from 8:30 
a.m. until 2:00 p.m., which allows 
mothers of young children to be at home 
before and after school. Another shift 
from 3.00 p.m. to 6:30p.m. attracts high 
school, college and vocational school 
students after their daytime classes. A 
third shift, from 5:00 p.m. until 9:00 
p.m., is staffed by students and by 
mothers whose husbands care for the 
children after completing their work 
day. 
Before going to work for Selby, 17 
percent of employees were either un- 
employed or out of the labor force. Only 
13 percent were in factory work; the 
remainder held a variety ofjobs, includ- 
ing sales clerk. office clerk, domestic, 
S e l b  y jobs are made accessible 
to neighborhood residents in 
one important way: they are 
part-time jobs scheduled to 
match the times when workers 
a r e  available. 
restaurant worker, o r  nurse's or 
teacher's aide. Jobs such as these are 
characterized by low wages and the ab- 
sence of fringe benefits, job security and 
advancement opportunities. Labelled 
"secondary labor market" positions by 
some economists, they are often all that 
is available to those with few skills, lim- 
ited geographic mobility and no estab- 
lished work history. 
The lobs available at the Selby plant 
contrast sharply with these prior jobs. 
The Selby starting wage of $2.97 per 
hour in 1978 ($3.82 in 1980) is I6 percent 
higher than the average $2.55 per hour 
Characteristics of Selby Bindery Work Force 
Characteristic 
Proximity of Home t o  Plant 
Same ZIP code a s  piant 
Adjacent ZIP code 
ZIP code close but not adjacent 















Less than high school 




that Selby workers earned in their pre- 
vious jobs. Still, the starting wage at 
Selby is only 38 percent of the average 
hourly manufacturing wage in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan 
area. 
Fringe benefits at Selby include So- 
cial Security contributions, holidays, 
vacation, access  to  employee- 
purchased health insurance and retire- 
ment plans, but not sick leave. Em- 
ployee benefits average 17 percent of 
the payroll, which is lower than the 34 
percent average for the printing and 
publishing industry. Thus, for both 
hourly wage rates and fringe benefits, 
Selby represents an improvement for its 
employees, compared with alternative 
part-time jobs available to them, but still 
modest compensation. 
An even more important difference 
between Selby jobs and alternative em- 
ployment is the opportun~ty for pro- 
motion and pay raises through good per- 
formance. An employee's work record 
is reviewed frequently, and raises are 
given on the basis of merit. Thus, within 
any group of workers of equal seniority, 
a wide range of wages are being earned. 
Last summer, for example, the hourly 
wage rates for workers who had been at 
Selby from two to four years ranged 
from $3.52 to $4.63. 
Selby employees also have opportu- 
nities to transfer to full-time jobs with 
long-term skill development and higher 
wages, both within the Control Data 
Corporation and with other industrial 
employers in the metropolitan area. 
Many transfers are arranged by Selby's 
plant manager and personnel director, 
who maintain extensive contacts with 
potential employers and consider place- 
ment part of their jobs. 
Plant turnover averages about 20 per- 
cent a year. In terms of layoffs and ar- 
bitrary firings, however, positions at 
Selby offer greater job security than do 
the employment alternatives for these 
workers. 
The combination of higher wages, 
fringe benefits. promotional and train- 
ing opportunities, and job security 
makes jobs at Selby "primary labor 
market" jobs: they provide improved 
opportunities for employees in both the 
short run and long run. These are em- 
ployment opportunities with which a 
poor household can at least begin work- 
ing its way to economic independence. 
Profitability 
The most striking fact about the Selby 
operation, however, is not simply that 
it provides inner-city employment, but 
that is does so while simultaneously o p  
erating as a financially viable private 
enterprise without substantial govern- 
ment subsidies. A comparison of the 
profitability of the Selby enterprise with 
that of the bindery industry as a whole 
clearly indicates that Selby is a finan- 
cially viable operation. Selby's gross 
margin on sales, at 56 percent, is vir- 
tually identical to that of the industry's; 
14 J a n u a r y  1981 
and Selby's profit margin of 7 percent 
for internal sales to Control Data Cor- 
poration and 9 percent for external sales 
brackets the industry average of 8 per- 
cent. Selby's return on investment of 13 
percent, however, is substantially be- 
low the industry average of 25 percent. 
These figures suggest that if Selby 
were independent of CDC and required 
to stand alone financially, then it could 
do so. The fact that its return on in- 
vestment is lower than the industry av- 
erage raises some questions about the 
long-run ability of Selby, if it were in- 
dependent, to attract equity capital. 
Furthermore, losses as high as $20,000 
in previous years, which were covered 
by CDC's "social responsibility bud- 
get," indicate that it has taken a number 
of years for the plant to break even. 
Nevertheless, as of today, Selby a p  
pears financially viable. 
At least five critical factors have con- 
tributed to the profitability of the Selby 
plant: 
economically efficient, labor-in- 
tensive production technology; 
high-productivity atmosphere; 
guaranteed markets; 
support services provided by the 
parent corporation; and 
good community relations. 
Production technology. The labor-in- 
tensive production technology that the 
Selby plant has adopted is economically 
efficient. Using large amounts of low- 
skill labor in combination with a few 
basic pieces of equipment not only pro- 
vides maximum employment opportu- 
nities, but also produces small-batch 
collating, binding and packaging at the 
lowest unit cost. 
A recent internal study by CDC, for 
example, compared the costs of the cur- 
rent hand collating approach with the 
costs of doing the same job with a 
$62,000 automated collating machine. 
The study estimated that machine pro- 
duction was somewhat cheaper than the 
hand method but that the cost difference 
was too small to justify the capital ex- 
penditure. The study found that other 
Selby operations were even less attrac- 
tive for conversion to capital-intensive 
production. 
High productivity. A second factor 
contributing to the profitability of the 
Selby venture is the high-productivity 
atmosphere in the plant. Selby workers 
do present more human relations chal- 
lenges to management than do workers 
at other industrial plants. Supervisory 
personnel have had to adjust to workers 
with limited literacy and English lan- 
guage skills, workers who have diffi- 
culty accepting normal discipline and 
authority relationships, and workers 
with complex, unstable home situations 
that intrude on their work performance. 
Problems involving irregular atten- 
dance, drug and alcohol abuse, and per- 
sonal financial management have all 
Control Data's h~r~ng pol~cy glves preference to neighborhood res~dents and uses economlc 
need as one employment cr~ter~on S~nce most mach~ne operat~ons at the Selby B~ndery can 
be learned quickly lack of experience or tramlng IS not a barr~er to hrmg 
been addressed at various times by \pe- 
cia1 classes conducted during work 
hours. Informal individual coun\eling, 
extra assistance, and flexibility in the 
application of rules are routine in plant 
operations. 
Nevertheless, a businesslike atmo- 
sphere prevails, and the financial neces- 
sity of individual and plant productivity 
is stressed. Troublesome workers are 
quickly released; weekly staff meetings 
emphasize the importance of Selby's 
output to the overall profitability of 
CDC; and peer pressure on the plant 
floor reinforces 'an orientation toward 
hard work and upward mobility. 
Guaranteed markets. Over 80 percent 
of Selby's output is "sold'' internally to 
the Control Data Corporation, with di- 
visions of the corporation required to 
purchase all bindery services from 
Selby. Since the quality and timeliness 
of Selby work is generally reported to 
be excellent, this requirement may be 
unnecessary. Nevertheless, it does pro- 
vide a guaranteed market which not all 
attempted replications of Selby would 
enjoy. Such a guarantee might be par- 
ticulary important during the early 
months of plant operations before an 
organization has become established. 
Similarly, the largest outside pur- 
chaser of Selby services, an insurance 
company, places Selby in a special cat- 
egory of "social responsibility" ven- 
dors along with, for example, the shel- 
tered workshop for the handicapped. 
While Selby's good performance record 
renders this designation partially super- 
fluous, there remains at least a marginal 
tendency for this customer to be more 
forgiving of errors. Another company 
trying to replicate the Selby experience 
might not be  perceived as especially 
worthy because of its inner-city loca- 
tion. and therefore might not enjoy this 
marketing advantage. 
Support services. Among the support 
services provided to Selby by its parent 
corporation, the most important is a line 
of credit for cash needs, without collat- 
eral and for an extended period of time. 
It is unlikely that commercial banks 
would be so  supportive. 
Legal, accounting, purchasing and 
other administrative services are also 
provided to  Selby by CDC. While Selby 
pays for these services through a cor- 
porate burden rate applied to its sales, 
the services are probably of a higher 
quality and more readily available than 
if Selby were purchasing them individ- 
ually from outside sources. 
Finally, managerial advice and tech- 
nical assistance are provided by senior 
executives within CDC. The impor- 
tance of this support has diminished as 
Selby's own management has gained 
experience and as the operation has be- 
come established. but it was crucial dur- 
ing the early years of the venture. 
Community relations. A final element 
in establishing Selby as a viable oper- 
ation is the cultivation by CDC of good 
relations between its plant and the 
Sclby-Dale neighborhood. The fact that 
employees are hired from the neighbor- 
hood is essential to this relationship and 
is the main reason cited by plant man- 
agement for the absence of vandalism 
or theft at the plant. The plant's "good 
neighbor" reputation is reinforced by 
other actions of symbolic importance, 
including attractive plant landscaping, 
provision of basketball courts in the 
parking lot for local teenagers, and par- 
ticipation in local civic and charitable 
activities by the plant manager. 
Repiicability 
It is easy to attribute the success of 
the Selby venture to circumstances spe- 
cific to the Control Data Corporation. 
Initiative for the project and sustained 
support have come directly from top 
management, especially the vice-chair- 
man and chairman of the board. CDC is 
a rapidly growing, profitable company 
that enjoys a wide reputation for being 
"employee-oriented," "socially-con- 
scious," and innovative. 
These factors have certainly contrib- 
uted to making the Selby Bindery a pi- 
oneer and a showpiece. Nevertheless, 
similar types of inner-city, part-time, 
low-skill plants can survive financially 
whether operated independently by 
small entrepreneurs or by major cor- 
porations that are less prosperous or  
more traditional than CDC. 
Any extra costs of operations engen- 
dered by Selby's inner-city location and 
"socially disadvantaged" labor force 
are apparently offset by extra savings 
from sources such as the willingness of 
workers to accept relatively low wages; 
the efficiency of part-time shifts for te- 
dious. fatiguing tasks; and the efficiency 
of low-skill. hand methods for produc- 
ing certain small-batch bindery prod- 
ucts. Entrepreneurial initiative may 
therefore be more important than social 
conscience in creating replicas of the 
Selby plant in other cities. 
One key question in assessing the ex- 
tent of possible replication is the size of 
the part-time inner-city labor force. The 
number of such workers is surprisingly 
large. In 1980, over 2 million potential 
part-time workers were residing in pov- 
erty sections of the nation's large urban 
areas. This figure includes 1.4 million 
persons already employed part-time, 
200.000 unemployed persons seeking 
parr-time work, and 500,000 persons 
currently out of the labor force but will- 
Ing to take jobs that fit their schobl 
schedules or home responsibilities. 
The most striking fact about the 
Selby operation is that it 
provides inner-city employment 
while simultaneously operating 
as a financially viable private 
enterprise without substantial . 
government subsidies. 
A second question in assessing pos- 
sible replication is that of potential 
product lines. To emulate the Selby ex- 
perience with part-time, low-skill work- 
ers would require identifying product 
lines with such characteristics as sus- 
tained demand, low capital require- 
ments, low hiring and training costs, 
and rapid worker fatigue (so that a part- 
time shift is more efficient than an eight- 
hour shift). Within CDC, i t  has been 
suggested that a plant such as Selby 
could profitably engage in such diverse 
activities as repair and rebinding of text- 
books, sorting of recycled products, 
production and repair of wooden pal- 
lets, and processing of merchandise re- 
fund coupons. 
Some Conclusions 
As important as what plants such as 
the Selby Bindery can do for its owners 
and inner-city employees is what such 
ventures cannot do. It is important, for 
example, not to portray these jobs as 
better than they really are. Jobs that are 
readily accessible to persons with vir- 
tually no skills and little work experi- 
ence are inherently tedious; the skills 
that can be acquired on such jobs are 
also limited. 
Similarly, there are bounds to the 
productivity which even the best em- 
ployee can achieve with limited skills 
and basic capital equipment; hence 
there are severe constraints on the 
wages an employee can earn. The high- 
est-paid production employee in the 
Selby plant, if heishe worked a typical 
five-hour shift per day for 52 weeks a 
year, would earn only $6,695. This is 
less than the $7,010 in annual benefits 
which the average Minnesota family on 
public assistance receives without 
working at all. 
Clearly then, although Selby jobs pay 
better wages than do other jobs avail- 
able to part-time workers in the Selby- 
Dale neighborhood, they do not by 
themselves provide an immediate and 
final exit from poverty or potential wel- 
fare dependency. The primary signifi- 
cance of the Selby-type job lies in its 
role as a conduit to other. better-paid. 
higher-skill industrial jobs. 
This incentive of advancement op- 
portunity contributes to the high em- 
ployee productivity of the Selby plant 
and hence its profitability. Enterprises 
seeking to emulate !he Selby experience 
on a strict profit-seeking basis. how- 
ever. would almost certainly offer fewer 
if any of the longer-run advancement 
opportunities that CDC offers. AI- 
though this aspect of the operation is 
least likely to be duplicated, it is the key 
to the Selby plant's social benefits. 
Some observers have sugdested that 
community residents and workers 
would be assured thece longer-run ben- 
efits if industrial development were un- 
dertaken not by profit-seeking large cor- 
porations. such as Confrol Data, hut by 
nonprofit comniunity-hased organiza- 
tions. The merits of this argument are 
hard to assess, but one fact is likely to 
overshadow all others: inner-city. part- 
time, low-skill operations, eben if finan- 
cially able to survive, are not likely to 
be highly profitable enterprises. There- 
fore, even if the enterpri\e is commu- 
nity-owned and desires to put all free 
resources into better compensation or 
enhanced training and advancement op- 
portunities for its workers, ava~lable re- 
sources are likely to be limited. When 
profits are minimal, differences in be- 
havior between for-profit and nonprofit 
enterprises become largely moot. 
The final grounds for being cautious 
about the potential contributions of ac- 
cessible industrial jobs to solving inner- 
city social problems is that of scale. The 
Selby plant has successfully identified 
one market niche in one city where low- 
skill, labor-intensive, part-time produc- 
tion can command enough revenues to 
support corporate profits and "primary 
labor market" jobs simultaneously. But 
even if many such niches were ex- 
ploited, the total number of jobs pro- 
vided would remain small in relation to 
the total employment and income needs 
of inner-city residents. With some 10 
million potential wage earners living in 
poverty, all market niches for Selby- 
type work would be exhausted before 
even a substantial minority of these mil- 
lions had been employed. 
Thus, while the Selby plant repre- 
sents a positive step. it must reasonably 
be expected to be a modest one. Un- 
subsidized, private sector job provision 
in the inner city cannot be expected to 
obviate the need for public programs, 
including those offering subsidized pub- 
lic sector employment. subsidized pri- 
vate sector employment. job skill train- 
ing, social services and public assis- 
tance. Profit-seeking private sector ini- 
tiatives should be encouraged, but only 
as one of many approaches to the mul- 
tiple needs of the inner city. 
This article is adapted from an Urban Insti- 
tute working paper. "Pan-T~me Industrial 
lobs and the Inner City: The Control Data 
Experience." 
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Faik to Gel 
By MARTIN BARON 
Timcs Slajf Wtitcr 
U%cn the new Adminjstration of 
Residcnt Richard M. Nixon an- 
nounced plans for a federally fund- 
ed industrial park near Watts 11 
ycars ago. Conmcrce Secretary 
Xaurice H. Suns  called it the f m t  
example of a "new approach to ur- 
ban problems. 
"Its beneflts arc going to go out- 
ward in waves, to improve :'lrtually 
cvcry aspect of life in the surround- 
ing community." he declared. 
What ultimately happened is an 
object lesson in the .disparity he- 
tween initial promise and final re- 
sulk between hope and the comp!ex 
realities of an inner-city ar&. It 
took 10 years to lease all space in 
Wars  Industrial Ptrk. Only ha!f the 
intended 2.000 jdbs have been 
created, and efforts to ensure that 
thosc jobs are filled by blacks from 
the community largely have failed 
Although one major ernploycr in 
the park. .kkheed Carp., has hired 
soldy from the commun~ty, thc 
success of its plant has failed to in- 
spire other potential employers to 
locate facilities in South-Central 
hi Angeies. The reluctance of oth- 
er  firms is based partly on real 
problems with the a&. Chider ing 
the Lockheed exarn~le. however. it 
also is based on long-held stertk- 
typed views of South-Central h s  
Angeles and its residents. 
The story of Watts Industrial 
Park may offer some important his- 
torical perspective if the new Re- 
publican Administration follows 
through on its campaign pledge to 
crcate low-tax industrial zones in 
inner cities. President-elect Ronald 
Reagan recently reaffirmed hjs 
commjlment to so-called "enter- 
prise zones" in a message to 4.000 
. mayors a t  a National League of 
Cities conference in Atlanta. Watts 
also offers a close look at just why 
large corporate employers have 
e y e d  away from such areas. 
continued 
I t  was off~cials of Lockheed, the 
3urhank .based aerospace giant, 
~ h 0  firs! proposed the park idea to 
.he developer, Economic Resources 
Zorp., a nonprofit biracial group set 
~p after the Watts riots In 1965. A. 
Zarl Kotchan, then Lockheed's 
xecident, had proposed doing 
jomethinp for the riot-torn tea. 
3ac-id Crourther, a public affa~rs  
itaff member with Lockheed-Cali- 
'ornia 0.. proposed the industrial 
>ark and a Lockheed facility that 
rrould fced parls to bigger plants. 
4 n u o o 3  Industrial Park 
Today, the 52-acre ~ndustnal 
lark in Lynwood, just b!ocks from 
A1atts, is fully lea~cd. But tcnants, 
txccpt for Lockhcei, make no spe- 
:id commitment to hire from the 
:urroundmg community. Among its 
enants, for example, is a fanlly 
neral-pcr!lshing company where 
mly six of 45 employees are black 
:nd where many Latlno workers 
re  drawn froin as far away as La 
'ucnte. , 
As for the industrial park havlng 
enelits that would spread "out- 
vard in waves," the commun~ty IS 
vorsc economically than it was a 
lecade ago. A t  last count in 1977. 
hc ~ncn~ployrnent rate of South- 
:entrd I~os  Angeles-which en- 
ompacses Watts-was 20%. That 
vas twice the city average arrd 
wlcc the 1970 rate People living In 
mverty also doubled to 32% of the 
;oiith -Ccnt~ al area's p~pulatroh. 
continued 
$$:$I an hour. firms in old-line industries. which hditionaliy hire 
have been opportunltia for advaXement. the unskilled and semi-skilled labor force that South. 
Nine supcrrison a t  the plant once enuy-level Central Los Angeles has Lo offer, have dwtd p lmu  on 
irainces. The cost control analyst was a fdnec .  So was the region'swrj~herv. 
theproduction ccn~-01 supe&r. . 
And, most important. the plant is as efficirnt as other* 
in the Lockhecd system. Absenteeism and tardiness arc 
neither better nor worse: i9b turnover is 25% below the 
& o r  Gkheed'r t o u l ~ d ~ c t u r i n g ~ r a t i O n s .  
says plant managcr Angel Mrrales: "We om'l wa2t 
noUmg because we're ro Watts We don't ask for ~ t h -  
ing kuuse we're m Watu" 
Called en 40 Bl$ Flra, 
The idea of Watts Industrial Park. however, atas to 
have several Lockherd-sM f i i s ,  each carrying out 
dmilar Waining program for the supposed "urlcmploy- 
ablm" livlng nearby. As part d a recruitment effort. 
Lockheed and i n d u s M  park offiuak called on about40 
mapr i n d u s M  companica-including Ccncral Motors. 
Western Elecrric. SinF;er. I a l .  Ford. Chrys:er. Hughes 
A l r d t .  Rockwell. h g l u  Afrrra[t and Rohr. New 
manu would be required ro K e  only h n  Lhe cur- 
rocnrhg community. 
'We got turned down everywhere we went" realled 
Crowher. the public affalrs executive who c r i q s m d  
the country in the recruitment drlve. "It isn't h a t  they 
were opposed to our projccl or not gmd citirens. They 
were dong theuown thlcgs." . . 
In most wses. CrowLhcr war uilh liltle more 
thanpleasanmes from lower-level corporate ofhuals. 
Aerospace funs  were caught in a recessian, with 
plants already operaung below capacity. Other f i i s ,  
based elsewhere, had no 6pecial allegiance to Los An- 
neles' inner city. Sull others felt thelr plan& were close 
;nough to ~Fle h e r  cily and *at affumal~ve acllon pol- 
ic~es were an adequate response to the area's problems. 
Plant Toun,hainlng . 
D e n  today. malcr emploj ers in Southern Caitfoma 
emphasize thcu a.'furnali\e aclion programs !n wtuch 
aoals are set for nunorlty h u m  Many brg firms also 
nok them efforts tomot~vate studencs~n inn&-city high 
schools bv urovrCln~ danr  rours and. In some cases. hu-  
ing sen\&; for p$ctune, nund tralung program 
dunng the school year. 
But mqor corporabons such as those in the aerarpacr! 
,field u ~ t h  planls in Hawthorne. Long Hcach and Tor- 
rance f~gure thcu planls atc close enough to South- 
Central Lol Angeles end ozecl the unemployed to 
ccme to them In search of work. - 
BY 1972, recrutmcnt of new tmanu had become so 
. .  . 
~ompanies uch as Ford. General Motom. U.S. Steel, 
Bethlchcm S te l .  Goodycar Tlre and Fur rbnc  Rubber,, 
faclng s:umping bmness, have laid at: more than 14,000 
worken Pnce Lbc Bummer of 1979 M a result of plant 
doslngs. At one lime, those plrnls employed as many M 
27.000 people. . 
Government oificiak hope that new indubtrj will 
move in to replace the old. If that happens. thc newcom- 
m are hkely to be in growth industries. They will be 
more technological. The demand for the Sou& Centrtl 
area's unsk~lled and semi-skilled kbar will be les. 
H o p  for F-j 
Many industrial real estate b k m  foresee a changr 
developing in the South-Central area's atvnclivenea 
for new plants and office& Their hopes rest ahma a- 
elusively on consrnrlion that is to hem within s few 
yurs on the Century P y w a y  Uut will cut through thc 
oea. The freeway ia rhrdukr l  for ampietion m Ihc 
early 1990s 
"Once they realize the freeway Is ping to be a rull- 
ty. I think the free market is going to knock down the 
doors to get in there." said Robert Draine. executive 
vice president of Coldwell Eanker and chalrman of the 
Lcs Angeles County Economic Development Council. 
The freeuay, however, should make it easier to tm: 
port l a b r  from elsewhere rather than hiring fmm the 
inner-city unemployed. But Draine said. "All we can do 
in economic development is bring in thepbs. Then it's 
up to the educational system to make sure people in the 
area devefop the skills to fill thepbs available." 
Yet South-Central Los Angeles' problem never d y  
has been a shortage of industry. Residents of the area 
have more industry in their backyard than mont com- 
munities. There is little available vaunt  industrial land. 
Because many parcels are owned by profitable iunk- 
yards, big employen comdermg p o d i l c  planrr Lhe 
area would find property surpnslngly expensive. 
Thtj Hire Onbiden 
The real problem has been getting indltstry In the 
neighborhood to translate into substantial employment 
for people who Lve there. Thcre Is plenty of evidence 
that many businesses in South-Central Lot Angeles do 
not hire people from the local community, particularly 
ILs black rcs~dcnu. Om atudy showed that blacks make 
VD only 30% of the work force B the m a .  Pthourh 
ddf~cult that Lk industnd park's bcard had rel;\ed I& Uiey represent at least two-th~rbsof thepopulat~on. " 
tUnd.wls for tenanu "Thcv look invtmdv who would (Sodth-Ccnwal Los Anzclcs tstmrcallv dcftned mnn 
hue a minonty work force &om anychere-'said Crow- 
ther, who then quit the board. But hb concedd "Had 
they stuck- by my standards, it's very possible t h e n  
would sti!l be n o t h ~ w  but theLoclLh,'cd plant." 
What came in mostly were small employers offering 
them~nimum wage for unskilled labor and new minority 
fLm8.a number of w p h  have faded . . 
Ski Plant fkfurblrhd 
In the meantime, industrial dcvc:opment In the area 
has been practically dormant-with the cxccpl~on of 
one plant expected to cpen a t  Tweedy Boult.vard and 
Alamcda Street, ncxt to H'atu. Family-owncd Becker 
Eroa Steel Supply Co. u refurb~shing en oldstcc ! faciU- 
ty and may employ 50 people Inilidly, with [he ptss~bil- 
ity forexpansion. , 
President Warren Rccker says there is a sinple rea- 
son lor moving to the 20-acre Watts Rile from the firm's 
m c n t  3.3-acre locabon further north on h s t  55th 
Sweet: The company nccdcd the extra space New con- 
6LrucUon and rch;bil~tation of old structures is being 
funded with a $2.8-million loan fmm the Sconomic 
Development Aaministnuon 
Other firms, however, have stu&o.sly rvrlded that 
!part of town. "A lot of employers are afraid for Lhcir 
.own personal safety. If you drive the area durmg the 
day. 400 a lot of unemployed young men and that 
Mares the hell out of people." w d  J x k  Karp, president 
.of Nauonal industrial Properties. a brokerage fum. 
Prc!pe:tive employm rlso worry atnut sccurity at 
area south i f  m i t i o n  &u~ev&,;l&iol El Sewdo 
Boulevard. east of the Harbor Freeway and wert of 
Alameda StmL)  , 
Some employers frankly admit that they do not hire 
many local blacks. At D 61 V Plating. Iocated m the 
Watts Industrial Park. only sDr of 45 employees w' 
black. There are 22 btrnos. *It's exceptronally difficult 
to find people with any desire to work in thir neighbor- 
hood." plant manngcr Henri Kemp said . 
Kemp figures that U.e f u m  will hire 65 peopie over 
the next six months, but the first 10 to I5 who nre hired 
probably w l U  not be black. "1 will probably go with 
Mencan-Americans because I know I don't have to 
worry about the fact the guy's going tobe here. 
'Pr8rnmtir. ReaHstlL' . 
'I try personally v u y  h u d  not to dircriminak." 
Kemp added. "I try awfully hard not to llllow this to 
happen, but it's a prngnratic and realistic attitude." 
Starting wagcs for unskilled labor a t  the f i  are 
$3.50 an hour, barely above the minimum, 
'l%e perception that South-Central Los AngelH Is ln- 
habited by people with little desire to work and Uttle 
ability to pcrfom is common among much of the white 
buslncss communtly. Indeed, a number of the umm- 
played are neither blcssed with p b  skills nor imbued 
with a work ethic. But the Lockheed uprkme h 
evidence that, offered something h t l e r  thm nunlmum 
wages m d  something more than dead-end work. the 
a ru ' s  joblerr wiU actively p m u e  employmenL 
rrmgmnding mwloyen ur me South-Cenlrrl 
who pay union-sde wrges invanably report no 
mat problem with work attrtudes or attendance 
Oese rums generay are not m ~ t l n g n u n y  newpt 
h a  lcadcrs m the South-Centnl community 
am*.her answer to the black employment pro[ 
tstibllshment of more m a n l y  bus~neaer. Black 1 
nessmen. the theory goe& be Countrd on to 
blacks. 
The theory was much in vogue alter the Watts I 
m d  private industry and government moved lyG 
continued 
slulls of h e n c a n  corwrzle bustrre& have tm be 
lng cad; pcrbaps the most publrwed Hack enterprise 
afrer fie rmt-t. The mzker of textik and mclal products 
was an eiriy model for President Nuton's "black caplta- 
hsm"program. Funded by a sponsoring white company, 
Aerojct-Gcncral Corp., it was saffed entirely by black 
management. 
' Aftrr a few early years of proqwrity, it began record- 
ing a n r r m  of stcady lots". U-irhin 2 3  years in Lhe 
earl! 1970s. it lost 51.5 million on $3.3 mil!lon in govern- 
ment contracts. Afler it was sold to Chase Manhattan 
Caprlal Corp.. thc old managcmcnt was ousted and a 
new team of black executives was installed 
BmL*Rcfused Financing 
Chaw pumped $5 million into the firm. But the coup 
k g r s r  for Watct hlanufacturing came when the firm's 
new preadcnt and Chase could nM agree on a diversifi- 
callon move. Chase felt that a hnk-up with a fledgmg 
lioustnn enpmrtrtny: f ~ r m  to manufacture sub-asem- 
h l w  for d f s h m  dnlling platforms wouki be too risky. 
Thc prcsrdenr of Chase blanhattm Qp~lal quit the 
Watu  board, and the bank refused to tlnance the new 
venture. After failmg to obta~n financing elsewhere. 
W a ~ u  hlanufaclurlng f~led for voluntary bankruptcy in 
,976. 
-. 
brc-ght to bear." 
Many of the bustness loans made tn South-Central 
b s  An~eles  were for snal! relad outftts. many of them 
mom-and-pop liquor stores. Many large re& firms 
have abandoned the area. Boarded-up rupamarkeu 
have become ccmmunlty landmarks. 
The city government's economic development efforia 
have recently centered on bnnging large commcrcrll 
enterprises back into Lbe area in an attempt to provide 
goods. jobs and the appearance of renewal 
ProJert on Sean Site 
Getting major chains Into the area has been an exact- 
ing struggle. %%en Sears, R ~ b u c k  & Co. closed IU 
store a1 Vermont and Slauson in 1976, the city began 
working to promote n shopping-enterhinmen! center. 
Only now, four years later, is land being cleared for a 
cenler fealuring a Boys Market grocery r m .  a Zodyr 
department store. a Sav-On drugstore and a McDonald's 
fast-food restaurant But the $8.8-million pm)ect would 
never have been possrble without $5 rmll~on in public 
A6sistancemd a E l  million gift of the land by Sears. 
Commercial developex dismiss pro)ects iu South- 
Central Los Angeles as impossible tasks. Without hung 
up a major supermarket, developers cannot get financ- 
ing And the major chains clearly are not anxious to put 
new stores In the area. CansLruction of future shopping 
centers without substantial public financing remains 
highly unlikely. 
Among the supermark&' complaints: unsteady busi- 
mss, wrth lots of customers when welfare checks amve  
in tho f ~ m  and thrd  weeks of Lhe month and ltmmt nc 
customers on the second and fourth weeks: more bad 
checks: more shop?ifting: more phony accidents and 
claims for damages; more shopping cart losses: crime 
against employees; vandallmn to buil&ngs and automo- 
biles. and lower productivlty because of the time it takes 
to process food stamps. 
The Ralph's chain says it loses money on nine out of 
10 inner-city markets, but keeps them open out of a 
"stmng commitment to serve the entue citv " 
Opportunttin Elxwbcre 
Othcr chains have little interest in the area. "Wre 
have better opponuruties for buildrng ~uccessful opera- 
tions in other area." mid Vom President Kenneth 
Olscn. 
Some chdn execubves are pmcularly blunt off the 
record. "We can't get Caucasian people to go in there 
and work. Cars are Lorn apart. Battmes are stolen. 
P m e s  are snatched. While people just won't go I r  
there." one president said. "We're losing m every black 
store we have." 
Many bunnes  and community leaders in the area re- 
gard such shopping centers as mcager c o n t r i b ~ ~ t ~ ~ n s  to 
the South-Central area's conomy, cnyway. There w a 
feeling that more money is taken out of the community 
through sales than IS put back through wages. 
Meantime. South-Ccntral L a  A~gelcs' economic 
troublcs are compounded by oLhcr factors. Gang bun- 
darias discourage some youngslcrs from ~ a k ~ n g  a bus Lo 
jobs !n other pzL? of town Fcr many, wrliare paymenu 
havc removed the incentive to work for minimum 
wages. Streel life cffers a compcltt~ve, though under- 
ground, econory. Vanous typesof "hustimg"-a cab\- 
all phrase for dcalrng drugs. punping, preying on the 
weak, or stealing-are of~en better understood and at 
least as well-paying P6 mainstrcarnbbs for unsLiLled L- 
bor. 
"If I can't flnd a lob lhat pays a1 Icas! 31.103 a month. I 
may as wrll keep dorng what I'm do~ng." s ad  one mus- 
cular 29- year-oid black man who says he "hustles" for 
a Ilvlna. With two kids and a mfe on welfare. he sava he 
has nor looked seriously for work m Lwc yurs.  
.
APPENDIX C 
TESTIMONY OF JIM HARRINGTON, VICE PRESIDENT, CITY VENTURE CORPORATION 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION 
2167 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 
March 11, 1981 
Thank you, Chairman Oberstar, Subcommittee members, ladies and gentleme 
It is indeed a privilege to present testimony and to participate today. 
I will briefly describe City Venture Corporation, its mission and role 
in urban revitalization and will outline the most important EDA relatio- 
ship to City Venture and one of its stockholder projects. 
CITY VENTURE is a for-profit consortium formed two and one-half years 
ago to plan and manage innovative, comprehensive and, most importantly, 
holistic programs for the revitalization of decaying seccors of urban 
'areas. In going about this task, we are careful to avoid the piecemeal 
and fragmented efforts which have unfortunately characterized past 
- - . -. 
efforts led by the public sector. 
The creation of jobs is City Venture's number one priority -- jobs for 
the unemployed and underemployed, with a related top priority of educa- 
tion and training. Jobs are made accessible to those who ne'ed them, anc 
work forces are stabilized and become profitable, through comprehensive 
programs of education, training and counseling. In a typical City 
Venture project area, a minimum of 2,000 new jobs are targeted. The 
primary strategy for this job creation is the start-up and growth of 
new and small businesses. Of course, we augment this strategy with 
programs to assist local established businesses to remain and grow in 
the inner city and to attract additional businesses from the outside. 
Our basic belief is that the private sector must take the lead in 
initiating and managing urban revitalization, and that it do so 
with the full cooperation of the residents, the businesses and the 
governments of the communities in which we work. We are convinced 
that, in the long run, City Venture is a solid business venture that 
will earn reasonable profits and will spawn other like activities. 
In contracting with City Venture, a client city agrees to target its 
resources to a specific project area that averages 200 acres, in size 
and a specific impact area that includes 40,000-60,000 residents. It 
is the residents of the impact area who benefit most directly from the 
jobs and the resulting economic well being they represent. 
City Venture recognizes that certain ingredients must exist for any 
revitalization project to succeed. In this regard, we require top 
level dedication and commitment from local political, business and' 
community groups. It is City Venture's goal in any city in which it 
works to bring about basic neighborhood changes -- changes that in 
time, will make the neighborhood economically and culturally self- 
sustaining, thereby reducing dramatically the requirement for outside 
assistance. 
Our for-profit consortium is currently composed of 14 stockholders of 
which 12 are for-profit corporations and two are national and inter- 
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national church organizations. Control Data is one stockholder. 
City Venture Corporation's formation grew out of successful and profit- 
able experiences of our stockholders, principally Control Data, in the 
inner city. In 1968, Control Data began establishing plants in the 
inner city, bringing jobs to where they were needed most. These plants 
have become profitable --'and more successful than their counterparts 
in rural and suburban areas. Of course, these facilities didn't become 
successful overnight. Many of the programs of job training, counseling 
and employee stabilization which Control Data today markets were the 
result of the immediate needs of these facilities. The innovative . 
technologies developed by Control Data, including PLAT0 computer-based 
education, energy efficient facilities and urban food growing and 
processing, as well as technology from other stockholders, provide 
much of the basis for City Venture revitalization projects. 
Small business is at the heart of City Venture's job creation program. 
Again, programs pioneered by Control Data form the basis for these 
efforts. These include the Business and Technology Centers, facilities 
which provide services to small businesses, including manufacturing, 
laboratory and office space on very flexible terms, centrally shared 
model rooms, accounting, purchasing and legal services, and a complete 
range of computer services and computer-based management education 
programs. 
City Venture began its first project in 1979 and has projects in Toledo, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Paul and Miami. We are ready to begin 
projects in Charleston, South Carolina and Benton Harbor, Michigan. 
Recently, the British Government contracted with City Venture to advise 
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on the revitalization of the Docklands Enterprise Zone in London. 
In each of the citieswhere it has initiated its concepts, City Venture 
is taking an innovative, holistic, implementation-oriented approach. 
Initial results are encouraging. But the best estimates are that it 
will take at least five years to make a substantial and lasting impact 
on a given neighborhood. 
City Venture's programs are designed to encourage investments that will 
produce profit for the private sector, tax increment for government, 
pride through jobs for the neighborhood, and most importantly, real 
opportunities for people to help themselves. 
Real progress to date gives evidence that the goal for self sufficiency 
is not a theoretical one -- but one that is possible, practical and 
already happening. 
A similar organization, Rural Venture, was created to plan and manage 
holistic programs for human and economic development in small towns and 
rural areas. As with City Venture, the core of Bural 
Venture's approach is job creation, primarily through small-scale . 
agriculture, small-scale food processing and other types of small 
enterprise, all supported by appropriate education and training. Rural 
Venture's current projects are in the states of Minnesota, Virginia, 
Alaska and the New England region. 
City Venture believes that the following conditions -- some of a general 










and create jobs in the inner city: 
The availability of seed capital to support the start-up of 
new business. 
Tax incentives. 
The expectation of business success. 
Available facilities. 
The expectation of investment success. 
Local commitments. . 
The availability of appropriate public incentives. 
While each of the above conditions are important and warrant more time 
to discuss, today I'd like to move to the end of that list and and 
discuss public incentives, since that is why we are here. 
While we are committed to the revitalization of urban areas through job 
creation, it is essential that there be adequate public funds to levera 
private sector dollars. We strongly believe, as do our investors, that 
any program of federal aid should be guided by the degree to which that 
money leverages development and job creation in targeted areas as oppos 
to unspecified programs where funds are available for a wide variety of 
purposes. 
Since the addendum to this presentation will give a more detailed 
project status, I would like to briefly note the job creation and fund- 
ing participation highlights of each project. 
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In Toledo, where City Venture is furthest along, and our goal is the 
creation of 2000 jobs over a five year period, we have used a combination 
of funding sources to develop the 23 acre job development area within 
the Warren-Sherman neighborhood. Preparation of the physcial infra- 
structure is jointly financed by two government funding programs: the 
EDA and UDAG. Their total commitment is $7.5 million. This in turn led 
to the commitment of investments by Control Data's Business and Technology 
Center, Libbey-Owens, Ford, Inc., and.0wens Illinois. Financing of the 
industrial, commercial and residential developments has resulted in a 
leveraging ratio which is growing from three private dollars for every 
public dollar granted. And of course, the future of economic development 
in Warren-Sherman will continue to grow. 
In the Baltimore Park Heights Community, City Venture and Baltimore City 
will create 2500 new jobs, again using a strategy of public and private 
investments. It has been our experience that when we commit to the 
development of a job creation project, such as the one we will help 
develop in Park Heights, there is a strong need for additional public 
incentives to solidify the investment of private money. In Baltimore, 
the City is counting on approximately $2.7 million over a two year 
period from the EDA to make improvements on the physical infrastructure. 
The City has already received a $1,000,000 loan from the Maryland 
Industrial Land Office for land assembly. 
In addition, Control Data Corporation and other investors will establish 
a $6 million Business and Technology Center facility and its subsidiary, 
Commercial Credit Company has established a bindery and packaging 
operation. The bindery-packaging plant, modeled after Control Data's 
highly successful Selby Plant in St. Paul is expected to create 200 new 
jobs. We think that the Baltimore experience of cooperation, between 
federal, state and local governments working in tandem with the privatt 
sector is the key to success. 
Our goal in Philadelphia is the creation of 2500 jobs. While we are at 
a fairly early stage in that process, EDA has contributed $200,000 to 
the state government which was passed on to the City to facilitate our 
strategy and Management Plan development. On the basis of a commitment 
of intergovernmental cooperation, a holistic approach and the high 
probability of incentives to bridge the inequities between the suburb 
and inner city, Control Data,has made a commitment to build a Business 
and Technology Center in the West Parkside community. In addition, 
Atlantic Richfield Company has committed to support the creation of a 
Laboratory Supply Company. 
The St. Paul Energy Park is another example of how public incentives 
have helped our projects become operational. With targeted money 
scheduled in three phases, the EDA has committed $5 million for physical 
infrastructure improvement in the Energy Park. In this unique project, 
- -. 
designed to create 6000 new jobs, there are additional public monies - 
committed, including $12 million from the Urban Development Action Grant 
Program. And, as in our other locations, there is significant private 
sector funds also committed. $60 million has been pledged for housing 
development and $18 million has been committed by Control Data for the 
energy focused Business and Technology Center. 
As you can imagine, by Control Data's commitment and support to City 
Venture, we are a pretty unique group. But it bears mentioning also 
that Control Data has helped cities outside of City Venture projects 
with job creation and the required industrial development by leveraging 
resources against public incentives. For example in San Antonio, 
Control Data is developing a manufacturing facility to provide 600 new 
jobs based upon a UDAG commitment of $18.8 million to the area. Control 
Data in turn is providing employment and training through its Fair Break 
program and will be instrumental in the planned establishment of a 
Business and Technology Center. 
In Bemidji, Minnesota, the City received EDA funds to help with the 
physical infrastructure and utility lines in support of the establishment 
of a Control Data facility there, providing over 400 new jobs. So it's 
apparent that where there is a need for more jobs and there are public 
incentives available, it is possible to attract private business where 
previously there was virtually no hope of success. 
The key to all of our existing projects is the cooperative arrangments 
between public and private sectors without which we could not succeed. 
It is a difficult task to convince private sector investors that we can 
bring all of the necessary ingredients into an urban area for revitali- 
zation, but what makes it feasible at all is the recognition from the - 
public sector that incentives have to be provided to make these invest- 
ments ultimately as profitable as any other business effort. 
Business decision makers need to expect that an investment will be 
successful, particularly in targeted areas. While public policy calls 
for rehabilitation of the inner city, cost of such rehabiitation are 
substantially greater than suburban counterparts. Businesses are not 
seeking government subsidies to increase their profit margins, but 
rather need financial incentives that will make urban locations less of 
. -- 
CRS-45 
an extraordinary financial risk than they now are. To ensure that thi 
investment will be long lasting, we believe strongly that any program 
federal assistance, whether financial support or tax incentiwc. must 
include a requiremem for comprehensive, holistic management of the 
affected area as a condition for participation in government funding 
programs. Such an approach is critical to City Venture's operations a 
we believe, to any urban revitalization effort. Besides the many 
benefits that result from this type of comprehensive planning, such a 
holistic process will help convince potential investors that a safe a m  
secure environment for the business and its employees will exist in 
that area. 
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to 
appear before your subcommittee today and to participate in this panel 
discussion. Given the efforts of City Venture the past two years in 
urban revitalization efforts, we stand ready to be of assistance to 
your Subcommittee in your continuing efforts to ensure that the urban 




City Venture Corporation was formed in August 1978, with its first stockholders meeting 
held in December of the  same year. The companyls first two contracts were received in 
May and June of 1979 and the first US: government funding for project activity 
implementation was awarded to  one of those projects in December of 1979. 
Today, two and one-half years later, t he  Corporation has had project contracts in six United 
States cities. Eoch one is different, with its own special issues, needs, and priorities; each 
is also in a different s tage of development or implementation. 
Warren-Sherman 
Toledo, Ohio 
City Venture's first client city was Toledo, Ohio. The project is in the Warren-Sherman 
neighborhood, located just west of downtown Toledo. The neighborhood occupies approx- 
imately 300 acres and is home t o  3,500 people in 1,200 households. Of the  total  population, 
90% is black, 40% has no high school education, and in 1979, an estimated 32% of the 
neighborhood's heads of households were unemployed, compared with 1 2% for the City. 
City Venture's goal in Warren-Sherman is the  creation of 2,000 new jobs over a five-year 
implementation period. These jobs a r e  entry-level positions, for which residents will be 
trained and which offer  opportunities for advancement. The jobs created a r e  targeted t o  
Warren-Sherman residents. Other project objectives were also specified in the  areas of 
workforce mobilization and stabilization and community revitalization. 
The strategy development phase of the  project was completed in the spring of 1980, with the 
implementation phase commencing thereafter. 
Toward the  fulfillment of the job creation gwl, 23 acres have been identified for the 
development of a neighborhood industrial park, t o  provide 570,000 square feet  of industrial 
space. Groundbreaking for the park is scheduled for Spring, 1981. Fully developed, the first 
phase of the  industrial park is expected t o  provide a total  of 1,300 jobs. 
Preparation of the park's physical infrastructure is jointly financed by two government 
funding programs: the Economic Development Administration and the  Urban Development 
Action Grant Program. United States government commitments of $7.5 million have been 
received. Private sector  commitments for t h e  industrial park are k d  by Control Dota's 
Business and Technology Center; other commi tments have been mode by Libbey-Owens- 
Ford, Inc. and Owens Illinois. 
The Business and Technology Center (BTC), constructed by Control Data Corporation, is one 
anchor for the industrial park. As previously described, the  BTC is an incubator for the 
creation and development of new, small businesses. Marketing of the BTC began in October 
of 1980. The Center will open in the summer of 1981 and when completed, will have created 
an  additional 440 jobs. An Annex t o  the  BTC, with 15,000 square feet  available for 
industrial rental, opened in December of 1980. 
Another project in Warren-Sherman is the creation of a neighborhood-based property 
maintenance and management company. The total projected employment of the company is 
12 full-time positions. 
Also recently located in the Warren-Sherman neighborhood is the  Brown Packaging and 
Bindery Company, which a t  full-scale production will employ 80  people part-time. The 
company was incorporated in December of 1980. City Venture s ta f f  worked with the 
company to  secure a seed capital loan for start-up. City Venture also assisted the company 
in acquiring the lease for a building for the company's operations. One-half of the total 80 
jobs in the packaging and bindery company will be targeted t o  neighborhood residents whose 
special needs require a part-time job. The other half will be open t o  Fair Break clients, to 
become the work experience component of the Fair Break program. 
Additional 'federal funds a r e  being used in the project area, together with funding provided 
by the  Toledo Trust and other local banks, t o  develop a neighborhood shopping center. 
Chosen by the neighborhood residents as a priority project for job creation, groundbreaking 
for the 4.5 acre shopping center will occur in spring of I98 I .  The center will c rea te  100 jobs 
and will offer 50,000 square feet of commercial space for 12 commercial activities, 
concentrating on grocery, hardware, and drug stores. 
The Toledo Trust Bank also recently announced plans for the  construction of a Branch Bank 
and Professional Off ice building in the Warren-Sherman neighborhood. The building will 
provide 12,500 square f ee t  of business space and will be located directly across the s t reet  
from the shopping center.  
Two job-related programs are  being implemented in the project in an  effort  t o  target the 
jobs created in the neighborhood t o  Warren-Sherman residents. The Warren-Sherman Fair 
Break Center opened last September. As already described, i t  is a job preparation and 
training program. The  Center offers work experience (40 part-time jobs a t  the  packaging 
and bindery company) and plans to serve 160 clients annually. Through January 1981, 38 
clients had been enrolled in the program. 
A job matching system has also been established in the project area, with t he  purpose of 
placing residents in neigf-borhood jobs. During 1980, t h e  system was manually operated. By 
the end of January, 1 98 1, use had expanded from 120 t o  2 15 clients. 
In the area  of community revitalization, one early implementation project in the Warren- 
Sherman area was a solar demonstration house - the rehabilitation and retrofitting of a six- 
unit abandoned building located in the  neighborhood. Financed by both City Venture and 
federal funds available to the City, the building was rehabilitated by a local minority 
contractor and equipped with a complete active solar heating and cooling system. . Residents 
were hired and trained t o  work on the rehabilitation. 
Today, housing units in  t h e  nsolar house", as i t  is called, a r e  being rented t o  neighborhood 
residents, some of whom were displaced by the  industrial park development. In addition, the  
house remains a visual example within t h e  neighborhood of energy conservation and 
efficiency in living. 
Other housing-related projects include a $1.2 million interest subsidy program, which us- 
both federal and local private funds, for home purchose and rehabilitation; moderate 
rehabilitation of 50 units of rental housing; and rehabilitation of scat tered public housing (to 
date including five buildings and 22 units). Future plans include construction of 300 factory 
built housing units, and two house moves from the industrial park area t o  vacant property 
adjacent t o  the solar house, with subsequent rehabil it a t  ion of the housing. 
Human services programs have also been developed. In the spring of 1981, a health care  
center will be established in the neighborhood, in conjunction with a local hospital. The 
health center will be located in a community service center and will focus on delivery of 
primary health care services t o  mothers and small children. 
Because arson has been o particular problem in the neighborhood, o community-anti-arson 
conference i s  being organized, with related programs t o  be subsequently initiated using local 
resources. Responding to  the day care  needs of the M1arre,n-Sherman residents, a neighbor- 
hood elementary school, recently closed by the school board, is undergoing reuse as  a Head 
Start Day Care facility, t o  be operated by the local.Economic Opportunity Planning Agency. 
Financing of the industrial, commerical, and residential developments has involved a 
combination of public and private funds, with a leveraging ratio of private t o  public 
contributions of approximately 3.0. It is anticipated that the job creation projects that have 




City Venture is just completing the strategy development phase of a project in Philadelphia. 
The neighborhood, West Parkside, occupies a little more than 230 acres and is located 
approximately 2-1/2 miles northwest of downtown Philadelphia. Over 90% of the neigh- 
borhood population is minority, compared t o  one-third of t he  City's population. In 1976, 
estimates of neighborhood unemployment were as  high as IS%, compared with 11% for the 
City, and in 1979, 28% of the residents relied on some form of public assistance. 
The project is supported by a strong commitment for public-private cooperation. The 
parties involved include the  City of. Philadelphia, the business community - represented by 
the Greater Philadelphia Partnership and the  Chamber of Commerce, the targeted project 
neighborhoods - represented by the  West Parkside Association, and City Venture 
Corporation. The Greater Philadelphia partnership and the  Chamber of Commerce have 
committed t o  jointly establish 250 new jobs in West Parkside, and the  Mayor has declared 
job creation through inner-city small business development a number one priority. City 
Venture's goal in West Parkside is t o  c r ea t e  up to 2,500 jobs. 
Industrial development plans for Phase I of t he  project include the  construction of a Busirtess 
and Technalogy Center (to which Control Data is already committed) and attraction of new 
industrial development, together t o  c rea te  more than 1,300 new jobs. Low cost manufac- 
turing space will be developed in existing buildings to c rea t e  another 400 new jobs. A later 
phase of industrial development will involve the  development of property currently owned by 
a railroad company, with an anticipated job creation of a t  least 1,000 new positions. 
Marketing of the presently available and phase I1 industrial parcels has already begun with 
personal calls t o  major corporations in greater Philadelphia. Prospects for early 
commitments include a neighborhood firm which is planning t o  expand, the relocation ond 
expansion of a small plumbing supply company, and a new laboratory supply company, all 
locating in West Parkside. 
In the area of human resources, the Philadelphia Office of Employment and Training 
recently received authorization from the  U.S. Department of Labor t o  begin a Fair Breok 
program in mid January, 1981. The program is expected t o  serve 104 clients in the first 
eight months of operation. 
In addition, the US. Department of Labor has committed $1 million funding for an 
independent living program in Philadelphia. The Transitional Assistance Program (previously 
described) will provide education, training and placement in unsubsidized jobs so  that 
physically and mentally handicapped persons may gain occess t o  private sector jobs. City 
Venture will work with local service delivers to  jointly implement the program. It is 
anticipated that the program will become operational in the spring of I98 1. 
Park Heights 
Bal timore, Mary land 
City Venture's project in Baltimore, Maryland is supported by another public-private 
partnership, involving the  City of Baltimore, the Baltimore Economic Development Corpor- 
ation, the Park Heights Development Corporation, and City Venture. 
Park Heights is City Venture's largest project area with 1,300 acres and a population of over 
44,000. It is located just northwest of downtown Baltimore. The neighborhood is over 80% 
black and 40% unemployed, compared with only 5% unemployed in Baltimore. 
The strategy development phase of the project was recently completed, with the project's 
implementation phase t o  begin subsequently. The project goal for Park Heights is t o  c rea te  
2,500 jobs over the five year implementat ion period. 
At the southern end of t h e  Park Heights neighborhood is an area of 47 acres previously 
identified by the neighborhood for future industrial development. Park Circle, a s  it is 
named, will be the focus of the  project's job creation efforts. Of the  total  47 acres, 40.3 
will be available for development in 1981/82. Limited marketing t o  date  has produced three 
minority business prospects and a possible developer for a multi-story industrial building. 
As in other City Venture projects, an anchor in the industrial park will be a Business and 
Technology Center, A new facility, it is expected to c rea t e  a minimum of 350 jobs. 
Another tenant in Park Circle will be a bindery- and pockaging plant, which will be 
established by Commercial Credit Company and will c r ea t e  a minimum of 200 jobs. 
Groundbreaking for t h e  BTC is scheduled for summer of 1981; the bindery and packaging 
plant will become operational during the  first quarter of 1981, 
The Park Heights Development Corporation is a local neighborhood organization which is 
taking o direct role in t he  development of Park Circle, They will lease a n  unused building 
from the City for $l/year and renovate i t  with a federally funded grant (an application is 
currently pending). A quarter o f . t he  renovated space will be designed for office use with 
the remainder allocated to manufacturing use. The renovated space is expected t o  create  
130 positions. . - . - 
Total job creation in Park Circle is anticipated t o  be 1,750 jobs. The remaining 750 jobs to  
be created in Park Heights will occur outside Park Circle, primarily in t h e  Northwest 
Industrial Corridor. The Corridor is on area of concentrated industrial activity, located 
along the western boundary of the  neighborhood, and currently in various stages of 
deterioration. City Venture staff will-assist the Park Heights Development Corporation and 
the Baltimore Economic Development Corporation in their efforts t o  upgrade this area and 
to create additional jobs within it, 
In the orea of human resources, the  development plan calls for t he  establishment of a 
resident employment center  based in Park Heights. The Center will offer job matching 
services for residents and employers, a s  well as  job preparatory training or specialized 
training. Proposed implementation projects also include coordinating a neighborhood-based 
security program, involving the participation of local police, shopowners, and residents. 
Energy Park 
St. Paul, Minnesota 
City Venture's role in Energy Park is not typical of that in its other project cities. The 
Energy Park project is the creation of an energy efficient and energy conserving working 
and living environment. Occupying 245 acres in the inner-ci ty, the project includes 
industrial (120 acres), residential (950 units), and commerical (100,000 square feet) de- 
velopment on a virtually undeveloped site. All construction and building design will 
incorporate the latest in energy efficient and conserving technologies. Two-thirds of the 
industries locating in the Park will be energy-related. The project goal is t o  create  6,000 
jobs. 
The Energy Park project came about as the result of a public-private negotiated investment 
strategy process, involving all levels of government, represent a t  ives of the private sector, 
and representatives of the public at-large. The Energy Park project is currently managed by 
a public-private association, including: 
9 the St. Paul Port Authority, who will market the park's industrial parcels 
Honeywell, Inc., who has been instrumental in designing the central energy system; 
0 Wilder Foundation, who will complete the residential development; 
0 Control Data Corporation, who is committed t o  constructing an Energy Technology 
Center on s i t e  (a modified Business and Technology Center, oriented toward the  
creation and development of energy-related businesses); and 
0 the City of St. Paul. 
This group, together with City Venture Corporation, comprises the Management Team. 
City Venture's role in development has been t o  provide a holistic focus, t o  facili tate 
Management Team activities, and t o  write the  development plan for Energy Park, 
documenting the  Management Team's consensus on programs and plans necessary for the  
Park's successful development. With a goal of targeting Energy Park's jobs t o  St. Paul's 
unemployed and hard-to-employ, City Venture was also employed t o  design the  human 
resource programs. .. - 
As a part of plan development, City Venture assisted the  City and the City's Manpower 
Office in obtaining a $1.5 million grant from a local foundation for job training. The grant 
is t o  cover a four-year demonstration job training program, targeted t o  Energy Park, and 
will effectively link t h e  new employers with St. Paul residents who need jobs. 
To date, the  Port Authority has issued $6 millian in bonds for housing development and for 
development of a speculative industrial building in Energy Park. Specific sites have been 
defined for the first 250 units of housing. 
City Venture's future role in Energy Park will be  t o  undertake the  implementation of a small 
business recruitment and development program, as well as operating the  job training 
program for Energy Park. The former would focus on marketing the Park to small or  new 
energy-related businesses and would create  an innovations network for assisting developing 
businesses. The network would provide small business persons access t o  organizations or 
individuals which o f fe r  services or  have special expertise in t h e  a r e a s  of new technologies, 
financing, management assistance, education and training, marketing,  labor supply, and 
special access t o  faci l i t ies  and services. 
Liberty City 
Miami, Florida 
In the  fall of 1980, C i t y  Venture contracted with two Chambers o f  Commerce  in Miami, 
Florida, t o  help them evaluate  t h e  commitments which they might make  t o  t h e  Liberty Ci ty  
neighborhood of Miami. Liberty City, predominantly a Black neighborhood, was  t h e  scene of 
civil disturbances in t h e  summer of 1980. Following on this controct ,  C i t y  Venture expects 
t o  be engoged t o  under take a full s t ra tegy effor t  in Miami, s tar t ing in t h e  spring of 1981. 
As part of its initial e f fo r t ,  C i ty  Venture identified private sec to r  commitments  exceeding 
$10 million. These commitments  were well-received by the  business communities, the  
neighborhood, and government representatives. 
New Business Development 
In addition t o  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  which Ci ty  Venture already has underway around t h e  country, 
two additional c i t i e s  a r e  expected t o  be  under contract  in t h e  f i rs t  quar te r  of 1981. 
Charleston, South Carolina, a town of 70,000 people, with a metropoli tan population of 
350,000 is contracting with Ci ty  Venture t o  undertake a full s t r a t e g y  f o r .  a small 
neighborhood (population 6,000) adjacent t o  i t s  port facility. A key par t  of t h e  s t ra tegy  will 
be the rehabilitation of a n  old tobacco factory building, t o  become a Business and 
Technology Center. 
A similar controct  will also begin in early 1981 with the  Ci ty  of Benton Harbor, Michigan, 
(population 15,000). This will be  t h e  first project which C i t y  Venture has undertaken in a 
very small city, and  as a result, t h e  ent i re  ci ty is t a rge ted  for t h e  job creation and 
revitalization effort. 
In addition t o  these  t w o  anticipated contracts,  City Venture is ac t ively  talking to a variety 
of other ci t ies around t h e  country. 
